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Abstract – In the semiconductor industry the reliability of 
devices is of paramount importance. Therefore, after removing the 
defective ones, one wants to detect irregularities in measurement 
data because corresponding devices have a higher risk of failure 
early in the product lifetime. Furthermore it would be desirable to 
consider multiple functional tests together due to existing 
dependencies. This paper presents a method to detect such 
suspicious devices where the screening is made on transformed 
measurement data. Additionally, a new dimensionality reduction is 
performed within the transformation so that the reduced and 
transformed data comprises only the informative content from the 
raw data. Therefore the complexity of the subsequent screening 
steps is simplified. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Semiconductor devices used in key product components 
such as motor controllers or in safety relevant applications such 
as airbags have to fulfill high quality requirements [1]. 
Therefore, many product tests at different operating conditions 
and temperatures are performed to check the functionality of 
these devices. Some of the tests have an analog output signal. 
The measurement data of these analog tests have to stay within 
predefined limits. Otherwise, corresponding devices will be 
scrapped since they are assumed to be defective. However, 
devices which pass the scrapping process are not necessarily 
“good” devices. Some of them are outliers with regard to the 
distribution of all passed devices. Those devices, called 
suspicious devices, are more likely to fail within the product 
lifetime. Hence, such devices should not be delivered to the 
customer.  
A few tests exist which especially concern the reliability of the 
devices, e.g. IDDQ (Direct Drain Quiescent Current) tests. To 
avoid the shipping of suspicious devices several, commonly 
one-dimensional screening methods are applied to such tests. 
Nevertheless, the fact that there are tests which are dependent 
on each other and the fact that measurements can be 
superpositions of several signals (e.g. process-related, noise) 
necessitates advanced screening methods. In the future, the 
increasing complexity and the miniaturization of devices 
additionally complicate the screening due to an increasing 
amount of data which has to be handled. 
Some approaches to improve the detection of suspicious 
devices and to detect them as early as possible are proposed in 
[2] – [6].  
One approach is a data transformation using Independent 
Component Analysis (ICA) in order to facilitate the visibility 
of abnormalities in the measurement data. It was shown in [5] 
that this method improves the detection of suspicious devices. 
There it was assumed that the tests are not completely 
independent from each other and that their measurement data 
consist of superpositions of signals caused by the 
manufacturing process, noise signals and signals indicating 
irregularities in the data. ICA is able to separate those mixed 
signals into their independent source signals, making it 
possible to discover hidden effects. However, not all source 
signals have the same information content to be suitable for the 
detection of suspicious devices. The problem of selecting the 
most relevant components for outlier detection arises. This 
addresses the problem of a suitable dimensionality reduction 
during ICA which was not investigated so far in the context of 
semiconductor-related measurement data. 
This paper proposes a method to determine the number of 
informative source signals which should facilitate the detection 
of suspicious devices. Furthermore, it shows the application of 
this approach combined with a one-dimensional outlier 
detection method and how the screening can be improved. 
II. SCREENING METHODS IN SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 
The main objective of screening methods in semiconductor 
industry is to detect irregularities in measurement data and to 
reject the identified suspicious devices since those are prone to 
failure and therefore should not be delivered to the customer. 
Screening methods are not only applied in order to check the 
actual functionality but rather to avoid lifetime failures of the 
product.  
 
Fig. 1. The bathtube curve illustrating the failure rate. 
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The most delicate period is the early lifetime because 
failures occur much more frequently during this period [7, 
chapter 4]. The bathtub curve in Fig. 1 illustrates the failure 
rate of a device over its lifetime. The first period, characterized 
by a decreasing failure rate, represents the early lifetime. The 
second period, characterized by an approximately constant 
failure rate, represents the product lifetime assured to the 
customer. 
A burn-in is used in order to remove early failures. There 
the devices are subjected to defined pattern at high temperature 
in a so called burn-in oven in order to put the devices under 
stress and to “simulate” the early lifetime which leads to a cut-
off of the early lifetime. During this process and afterwards the 
devices are tested again to identify those which have been 
damaged through the burn-in procedure and those whose 
properties have been changed significantly. The identified 
devices will be scrapped. Burn-in testing is a well-known and 
effective method to detect early failures. However, a long 
testing time and specific equipment is required for this 
procedure making the burn-in expensive. Since burn-in does 
not lead to the identification of all suspicious devices some of 
them still remain which could become failures in the product 
lifetime. It would be desirable to discover such devices by 
screening methods as soon as possible and perhaps even 
shortens or skips the burn-in testing procedure. Commonly 
used screening methods are described in the following. 
A. Part Average Testing (PAT) 
PAT is mainly performed on tests which are classified as 
reliability relevant, e.g. IDDQ. In this case not only the devices 
outside the predefined specification limits but also the outliers 
based on the distribution of the measurement data should be 
rejected. To determine the PAT limits usually the standard 
deviation  is calculated and a normal distribution of the 
measurement data is assumed. Common choices of the PAT 
limits are ±6  [8]. All devices outside these limits are rejected 
(see Fig. 2). Although PAT is a frequently used screening 
method in semiconductor industry, it has the disadvantage that 
it is a one-dimensional approach. Therefore, it is not possible to 
detect outliers which only become apparent when taking the 
measurement data of two or more tests into account. 
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Fig. 2. Example for specification limits and PAT limits.  
B. Lonely Die Screening 
It is assumed that devices being surrounded by defective 
devices are more likely to fail early compared to those which 
are in a “good neighborhood”. For this reason those devices 
will be scrapped. There are several rules, e.g. being surrounded 
by a specified number of defective devices or being in a row 
with defective devices, to make a decision to reject or keep the 
devices. 
III. DATA TRANSFORMATION WITH ICA 
It is assumed that the measurement data result from a 
mixture of signals caused by the manufacturing process, noise 
signals (e.g. due to the measurement equipment) and signals 
indicating irregularities in the data. Therefore, screening is 
complicated and it would be preferable to investigate the 
signals independently. ICA is a method of multivariate 
statistics which is able to decompose signals received from a 
linear mixing process of stochastically independent signals into 
their source signals [9]. This separation can be performed 
neither knowing the mixing process nor the original signals. 
The ICA model can be written as 
 = 	 , (1) 
where = ,… ,  denotes the vector of the  mixed 
signals and = ,… ,  the vector of the  source signals 
or sources with ≥ . The ×  matrix  is called mixing 
matrix. Due to the fact that only the mixed signals  are 
known, it is impossible to calculate  or  conventionally. To 
tackle this problem, one has to assume that  and  are random 
vectors. Hence,  will turn into a  ×  matrix  and s into a ×  matrix , where  denotes the sample size. Thus, the 
ICA model can be written as 
 
⋯⋮ ⋮⋮ ⋮⋯ = 	
⋯⋮ ⋮⋯  , (2) 
respectively 
  = 	 . (3) 
ICA separates the mixed signals by maximizing the 
independence of the source signals , … , . This can be 
performed by maximizing the non-Gaussianity since linear 
compositions of independent components are more normally 
distributed than the components themselves [10]. This fact is 
based on the central limit theorem. Therefore, ICA is not able 
to decompose multiple Gaussian source signals. Consequently, 
they will be assigned into one source signal. For further 
information regarding the theory of ICA estimation see [9]. 
Relating to the measurement data,  equates to the number 
of performed analog tests per device and  equates to the 
number of measured devices. Accordingly, the matrix 	 contains the measurement data where  denotes the 
measurement value of the th test and th device. Since ICA 
transforms the data, making the new, transformed tests as 
independent as possible, subsequent one-dimensional outlier 
detection on the transformed data  is much more promising 
than on the original measurement data . Furthermore, the 
separation can reveal characteristic features and irregularities 
in the data. A pattern which is caused by the manufacturing 
process of the devices will be called process-related signal. A 
signal indicating irregularities, one is interested in, will be 
called risk-relevant signal. 
IV. DETERMINING THE NUMBER OF INFORMATIVE SOURCES 
During ICA it is possible to perform a dimensionality 
reduction. In this case < , i.e. the number of the 
transformed tests is less than the number of the original tests. 
This is useful, for example, if similar measurement data of 
many dependent tests should be investigated together. Even if 
the number of those tests is large, the number of informative 
source signals, i.e. process-related and risk-relevant signals, 
can be comparably small, because outliers may be seen in 
multiple tests or their combinations and process-related signals 
are expected to be present in each of the tests. If so, this 
information should be summarized and a dimensionality 
reduction is strictly recommended [9, chapter 13]. Because as 
soon as ICA has already detected the informative source 
signals and a Gaussian noise component, ICA tries to find 
further characteristics in the measurement data if it is forced to 
decompose the remaining signal components. As a 
consequence, ICA launches into tiny effects so that spurious 
characteristics will be indicated. Hence, nearly every device 
will be suspicious for an oversized number of computed 
signals. However, if the dimensionality is reduced too much, 
there will be a loss of information and probably not all 
informative sources will be found. In this case, not all 
suspicious devices can be detected. 
As the number of informative sources varies with the 
number of outliers, it is not known beforehand and has to be 
determined from the data. This is a frequently discussed 
problem and suitable procedures are often tailor-made to the 
type of data under investigation. A conventional approach is 
choosing the minimum number of components that explain 
most of the expected variation [9, chapter 13]. But in many 
cases such components are not related to the risk-relevant 
signals [11]. For this reason, other approaches were analyzed 
[11] – [13]. Except of [11] these methods are considered for 
data from other areas (e.g. human speech signals) and have not 
yet been applied in the context of semiconductor-related data. 
Furthermore, ICA is often applied only for a small number of 
mixed signals. However, there can be hundreds of dependent 
tests for semiconductor devices.  
A. A new Approach for Dimensionality Reduction  
As already mentioned ICA searches for characteristics in 
data and filters out process-related signals and risk-relevant 
signals. The remaining signals should be Gaussian noise. This 
constitutes the basic idea of the new approach. According to 
that, it should be possible to decide based on the Gaussianity or 
non-Gaussianity of a source calculated by ICA without 
dimensionality reduction whether this source is an informative 
one or not. But due to the fact that more than one Gaussian 
noise signal will be summarized in one signal the problem of 
spurious characteristics mentioned above arises and all or 
nearly all calculated sources will be non-Gaussian. 
Therefore, an iterative method is suggested where ICA is 
performed with dimensionality reduction for an increasing 
number of source signals to be computed. The sources are 
tested for Gaussianity after each ICA decomposition. As soon 
as one of the sources is Gaussian, the algorithm terminates and 
returns the computed components without the Gaussian signal. 
Therefore, only the informative source signals are returned. 
The pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 1. The computed 
sources will be used for subsequent outlier detection. 
Algorithm 1 Calculation of the reduced source signals 
1 for = 1 to  do 
2 perform FastICA algorithm with  
dimensionality reduction to  components 
3 for = 1 to  do 
4 check component  for Gaussianity 
5 if  is Gaussian then 
6 delete  from the calculated sources 
7 go to line 10 
8 end if 
9 end for 
10 end for 
11 return calculated source signals, without Gaussian signal
B. Probability of the Error of the second kind 
For the test on Gaussianity the level of significance  can 
be specified to control the probability of the error of the first 
kind, i.e. the probability of an incorrect rejection of the null 
hypothesis  given by  
 :		 	~	 , i.e. source  is Gaussian. (4) 
In our investigations we choose = 1%. Since holding the 
null hypothesis interrupts the proposed algorithm, the 
probability of the error of the second kind denoted by , i.e. the 
probability of an erroneous holding of the null hypothesis, is 
really crucial. Therefore, this probability should be acceptably 
small. Unfortunately  cannot be calculated directly in general 
but can be obtained by simulation studies. As  depends on the 
sample size and the distribution with the corresponding 
parameter selection, random numbers that fulfill the properties 
of interest have to be generated in order to determine the 
frequency of the occurrence of the error of the second kind. 
Multiple executions permit an estimation of the probability of 
this error and its robustness. We performed such simulations 
for the most popular distributions with different parameters and 
for various sample sizes. In particular we simulated  for the 
data we used in section V. Furthermore the chosen test on 
Gaussianity has an impact on . Therefore, we performed our 
simulations for various tests.  
V. APPLICATION ON SEMICONDUCTOR DATA 
For our investigations we only considered analog tests 
which are dependent and have similar measurement data. We 
investigated wafers separately in order to eliminate influences 
of wafer-to-wafer variations. All computations were made in 
MATLAB. The dimensionality reduction was performed by 
Algorithm 1 which was programmed by us using the FastICA 
algorithm of Aaapo Hyvärinen, which can be downloaded from 
[14]. For the test on Gaussianity we used either the one-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-Test) or the Shapiro-Wilk test 
(SW-Test) provided by MATLAB. The choice depended on 
the data under investigation. In general, the probability  was 
smaller but the number of computed sources was higher for the 
SW-Test. If  was acceptably small for both tests, the KS-Test 
to receive the smallest possible number of sources was chosen. 
A. Examination of IDDQ Data: Use Case I 
In the first example, IDDQ (Direct Drain Quiescent 
Current) data from wafer level testing of a complex micro-
controller were used. The devices that constituted the sample 
set passed the whole wafer level testing process. Therefore, 
they were classified as “good devices”. For the chosen product = 97	wafer level IDDQ tests were performed and the wafer 
under investigation had = 1296 passed devices that should 
be tested for suspicious ones. Hence the matrix 	 of the 
observations was a 97	 × 1296 matrix.  
As it is known from device physics that IDDQ data are log-
normally distributed [15], we simulated  for log-normally 
distributed random numbers using the parameters ,  and 
their variations estimated from the IDDQ measurement data. 
Using the SW-Test  was between 0%  and 0.4%  and its 
median was zero for = 1200  devices. Therefore,  was 
acceptably small. This leads to a high power 1 −  of the test, 
i.e. to a high probability that the test correctly rejects the null 
hypothesis assuming that the data are log-normally distributed. 
This was not the case for the KS-Test.  
The proposed algorithm using the SW-Test detected 11 
transformed tests or rather informative source signals which 
are shown in Fig. 3. One of these source signals is clearly 
different from the other ones. The visualization of this signal 
by means of the wafer map in Fig. 4 shows a pattern which 
should correspond to a process-related signal, since it can be 
seen less evident in each of the original IDDQ tests. If there is 
a process-related problem during manufacturing which causes 
a specific pattern on the wafer, this could also be filtered out by 
ICA. The other 10 source signals are either approximately 
Gaussian with one or only a few outliers or signals showing a 
weak structure only in their probability plots. The sources, 
which are nearly Gaussian, are expected to be signals 
indicating irregularities in the measurement data because there 
are no similarly distributed tests in the raw data. The 
probability plot for such a source can be seen in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 3. All new, transformed tests or rather source signals. 
To detect suspicious devices we performed subsequent one-
dimensional outlier detection on each of the reduced and via 
ICA transformed source signals. The outlier detection was 
performed by the PAT method using a ±8  limit. Normally a ±6  limit is used [8] but the suspicious devices clearly differ 
from the other ones after ICA enabling a wider limit to be 
sufficient for screening the outliers in this study. 
 
Fig. 4. Data of a transformed test or rather process-related signal. The value 
of each device is depicted by colors and the devices are arranged due to their 
location on the wafer. This source shows a distinctive pattern.  
 
Fig. 5. Data of a transformed test or rather risk-relevant signal. The outlier 
corresponds to a suspicious device. 
Since burn-in is an effective method to screen early 
failures, the pass-fail-information resulting from the post  
burn-in package level IDDQ testing was used to verify the 
identified outliers. Table I. shows the identified suspicious 
devices and their validation regarding the package level IDDQ 
pass-fail-information. As the table shows, 4 of 5 package level 
fails were detected correctly. Another 3 devices, characterized 
as suspicious ones, passed the package level testing process. 
Nevertheless those devices could fail within product lifetime 
with a higher probability. Compared to the new method, 
commonly used screening methods wouldn’t have detected the 
4 package level fails. 
TABLE I.  VALIDATION OF THE DETECTED SUSPICIOUS DEVICES 
 
pass-fail-information based on  
package-level IDDQ fails 
pass fail 
classification 
via method 
not suspicious 1120 1 
suspicious 3 4 
B. Examination of IDDQ Data: Use Case II 
In the second example, again IDDQ data from wafer level 
testing of a complex micro-controller but of a different product 
were examined. For this product  = 200	wafer level IDDQ 
tests were performed and the wafer under investigation had = 460 passed devices. 
Like the previous example we simulated the probability  
for log-normally distributed random numbers using the 
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parameters estimated from the IDDQ measurement data. The 
boxplots in Fig. 6 depict the results of the simulations for 
various sample sizes using the KS-Test. As the maximum of  
is 0.2% for  = 450 devices,  is acceptably small. 
 
Fig. 6. Simulated  for log-normally distributed random numbers with ≅−10.6  and ≅ 0.6 . For each sample size 500 times 500 samples were 
generated to estimate 500 -values illustrated in the related boxplot. 
The proposed algorithm using the KS-Test detected 17 
informative source signals which are shown in Fig. 7. Again 
one signal (in red) is set apart from the other ones. The 
probability plot of this process-related signal is shown on the 
left hand side in Fig. 8. The other 16 sources are approximately 
Gaussian with one or only a few outliers. The probability plot 
for such a risk-relevant source can be seen on the right hand 
side in Fig. 8.  
 
Fig. 7. All transformed tests or rather source signals. Process-related signal 
in red. Risk-relevant signals in blue. 
 
Fig. 8. Probability plot of the process-related signal on the left hand side. 
Probability plot of a risk-relevant signal on the right hand side. 
We performed subsequent one-dimensional outlier 
detection as described in the previous example. Again, the 
pass-fail-information resulting from package level IDDQ 
testing was used to verify the identified outliers. Table II. 
shows that 4  package level fails were detected correctly. 
Moreover, these fails were the only package level IDDQ fails 
on the wafer under investigation. Furthermore, 8 devices were 
identified as suspicious ones but passed the package level 
testing.   
TABLE II.  VALIDATION OF THE DETECTED SUSPICIOUS DEVICES 
 
pass-fail-information based on  
package-level IDDQ fails 
pass fail 
classification 
via method 
not suspicious 444 0 
suspicious 8 4 
C. Examination of IDDQ Data: Use Case III 
In the third example, the potential of the proposed 
algorithm combined with one-dimensional outlier detection 
will be demonstrated by analyzing an early failure, returned 
from the customer, which passed the whole testing process. 
Analyzing the measurement data of tests which concern the 
reliability of the device, more precisely IDDQ data, showed 
that it would have been possible to detect the returned device 
using the proposed method. The corresponding wafer had =989  passed devices. For this product 15  IDDQ tests were 
performed.  
The proposed algorithm using the KS-Test calculated 4 
informative source signals, which are shown in Fig. 9. It can be 
seen that there are most likely 3 process-related signals (source 
1, 2 and 4) and 1 risk-relevant signal (source 3). The mean of 
each source is close to 0, as the data have been centered when 
removing site effects from the raw data. Nevertheless, the 
mean of source 1, 2 and 4 is much bigger compared to the 
mean of source 3. The risk-relevant signal, which is shown in 
Fig. 10, is Gaussian with one outlier. This outlier is precisely 
the returned device. An outlier detection performing the 
screening only on the risk-relevant source would detect this 
early failure without rejecting further devices. Furthermore, 
examining the data for each IDDQ test individually or 
analyzing the ΔIDDQ values, which is a common approach for 
IDDQ failure analysis, would not identify the returning device. 
The probability plot of the Δ IDDQ values can be seen in 
Fig. 11. The returned device is highlighted in red. 
 
Fig. 9. Boxplots of the calculated transformed tests or rather source signals. 
 
Fig. 10. The risk-relevant signal whose outlier is the device returned by the 
customer. 
 
Fig. 11. Probability plot of the maximal ΔIDDQ value of each device. The 
returned device is highlighted in red.  
VI. CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK 
We proposed a method which is able to reveal suspicious 
devices having a higher risk to fail early in the product lifetime 
based on the processing of several hundreds of similar, 
dependent tests. This is done by a data transformation called 
ICA and an embedded dimensionality reduction. The data 
transformation and reduction was combined with one-
dimensional outlier detection in order to identify the suspicious 
devices. The presented method was applied on semiconductor 
measurement data, in particular IDDQ data, and verified by 
reasonable criteria. This method detects burn-in or package 
level failures earlier and thereby reduces the test costs. 
Furthermore, the method can be helpful in order to identify 
devices that are predestinated to be customer returns.  
The method is not limited to IDDQ or rather log-normally 
distributed data. However, it must be noted that the power of 
the chosen test for data reduction has to be acceptably large to 
ensure a reasonable data transformation, reduction and thereby 
a successful subsequent screening of suspicious devices. 
For future research it would be useful to work on an 
automatic grouping of the sources to separate the risk-relevant 
signals and thereby reduce the overscreening. Alternatively, 
one can use screening methods taking the distribution of each 
source signal into account. Another focus of future research 
could be the identification of groups of similar, dependent test 
for which it is beneficial to apply the presented method. 
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